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Abstract
Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that
elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The
Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many
participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-
known public figure with publicly available personal data and well-
known positions on public matters. This provides excellent grounds
for a study of spatial voting: In this brief note we study voting in the
Papal Conclave after the resignation of Benedict XVI. We describe the
method of the election and based on a simple estimation of certain
factors that seem to influence the electors’ preferences we calculate the
power of each cardinal in the conclave as the Shapley-Shubik index of
the corresponding voting game over a convex geometry.
Keywords and phrases: Papal Conclave, game over convex ge-
ometry, Shapley-Shubik index.
JEL codes: C71, D72
1 Introduction
The election of Pope Francis has attracted much attention among Catholics
and non-Catholics alike. As the religious leader of some 1.2 billion Catholics
worldwide, the Pope has an enormous influence on world politics – far more
than what being the head of the smallest ministate would imply. The me-
dia hype is enhanced by the complex voting procedure entwined with old
traditions and secretive elements. We are, however interested in the Pa-
pal Conclave – the electing body – for another reason. The voting power
literature studies examples that are either instances of qualified weighted
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majority voting, such as that in the European Union (Ko´czy, 2011) where
each of the voters have a give weight or examples of voting in a parliament
or a similar voting body. In the latter case the voters are all individuals with
equal weights, but they form parties or other voting blocks. Party discipline
tends to be high, so that party members almost always vote the same. If
this is always true we might as well consider a weighted voting where the
party leader chooses a position and all party members follow. In practice
there may be absent, or rebel voters making the analysis somewhat more
complex (Ko´czy and Pinte´r, 2011). In the Papal Conclave we only have
a set of cardinals with certain policy preferences, possibly with suspected
voting blocks, but no formal parties. Especially not with parties that could
employ sanctions on rebel voters. In sum: each cardinal chooses his position
independently of others.
The new pope is elected by the Papal Conclave consisting of the cardi-
nals under 80 using a two-thirds majority. In the election of Pope Francis
this meant 117 cardinals – 115 participating. The voting rules are very elab-
orate where, until the required majority is reached, several voting rounds
might take place. With this process the positions of the participating car-
dinals might and do change. In our simple analysis, however we ignore the
changes of preferences, the strategic games that may be played. We seek to
determine the more influential cardinals in the voting process based on their
positions. Our assumption is that the elected Pope will then be similar to
these powerful players, they themselves are likely candidates, although some
would likely use their influence to elect someone else.
Since Shapley and Shubik (1954) adopted the Shapley value to measure
a priori voting power, we use simple games to model voting situations. In
these games there are no actual payments, power itself is the payoff of the
game. A coalition is either winning and has a payoff of 1, or losing getting
0. We are interested in swing voters who can turn a losing coalition into
a winning one. Due to the symmetry of the voting situation, the swing is
always the 77th supporting cardinal; in the theory of the Banzhaf power
index (Banzhaf, 1965), where we look for critical players, the same player is
critical for the coalition.
If we assume that any combination of 77 cardinals is equally likely, we
are very remote from reality. There are very strong interest groups based
on location (Italy, America, Europe) and progressiveness. We assume that
a candidate that is acceptable to both a liberal and a conservative cardinal
will also be acceptable to a moderate cardinal. These, so-called games on
convex geometries (Edelman, 1997) presume that only convex coalitions may
form. Both the Shapley-Shubik index (Bilbao and Edelman, 2000) and the
Banzhaf index (Bilbao, Jime´nez, and Lo´pez, 1998) has been extended to
such games.
In the following we introduce our notation, explain the geometry of the
game and present our papabili.
2
2 Power indices
2.1 Simple games
First we introduce the usual terminology and notation. Let N = {1, . . . , n}
be the set of the players. v : 2N → R, where v(∅) = 0, is a transferable
utility (TU) cooperative game (henceforth game) with player set N . For
any player i and any coalition S: v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S), that is v′i(S) is
player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game v. Let v′i stand for
player i’s marginal contribution function in game v. Player i is a null-player
in game v if v′i = 0. Finally, |A| is for the cardinality of set A.
A voting situation or voting game is a pair (N,W), where the players
are the voters and W denotes the set of winning coalitions. We consider
simple voting games where
1. ∅ /∈ W and N ∈ W,
2. if C ⊆ D and C ∈ W, then D ∈ W,
3. if S ∈ W and T ∈ W, then S ∩ T 6= ∅.
Condition 3 requires the game to be proper, that is, a motion and its
opposite cannot be approved simultaneously.
Let Γ¯N denote the set of proper simple voting games over the player set
N .
We can also write a simple voting game in the form of a transferable
utility game v, where v(S) = 1 if S ∈ W and 0 otherwise. The term
”simple” comes from having coalitions with payoffs 0 or 1 only.
We study the players’ ability to change decisions. If, by joining a losing
coalition, a player can turn it winning, we call the player swing. Voting
power then refers to this ability to change decisions.
Given a game v of Γ¯N , an a priori measure of voting power or power
measure κ : Γ¯N → RN+ assigns to each player i a non-negative real number
κi(v), its power in game v; if for any game v of Γ¯N :
∑
i∈N κi(v) = 1, then
it is also a power index.
In the following we explain some of the well-known indices. The Shapley-
Shubik index φ (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) applies the Shapley value (Shap-
ley, 1953) to simple games: Voters arrive in a random order; if and when a
coalition turns winning the full credit is given to the last arriving, the piv-
otal player. A player’s power is given as the proportion of orderings where it
is pivotal, formally for any simple voting game v player i’s Shapley-Shubik
index in game v is as follows
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
v′i(S) ,
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where s = |S|.
The Banzhaf measure ψ (Penrose, 1946; Banzhaf, 1965) is the vector of
probabilities that a party is critical for a coalition, that is, the probabilities
that it can turn winning coalitions into losing ones. Formally, for any simple
voting game v player i’s Banzhaf-measure in game v is as follows
ψi(v) =
ηi(W)
2n−1
,
where ηi(W) is the number of coalitions in W in which i is critical. When
normalized to 1, we get the Banzhaf index β (Coleman, 1971). Formally, for
any simple voting game v player i’s Banzhaf index in game v is as follows
βi(v) =
ηi(W)∑
j∈N
ηj(W) .
2.2 Games over convex geometries
The set L ⊆ 2N of sets of coalitions is a convex geometry (Edelman and
Jamison, 1985) if two properties are satisfied:
1. ∅ ∈ L and L is closed under intersection.
2. if S ∈ L and S 6= N then there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ L.
The set L collects convex coalitions. We call i ∈ S for S ∈ L an extremal
point if S \{i} ∈ L. We denote the extremal points of S by δ(S). For games
over convex geometries we can also define winning and losing coalitions.
(a) Convex rectangle (b) Concave rectangle
Figure 1: Examples of coalitions
We say that i is a convex swing in coalition S if S ∈ L, i ∈ δ(S), v(S) = 1,
but v(S \ {i}) = 0. Note that if i ∈ δ(S), S \ {i} ∈ L this property only tells
about the transition between feasible coalitions. If these extremal players
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continue to find the coalition acceptable, a situation where internal players
would like to leave the coalition is not conceivable. Therefore no power can
be derived from turning a convex coalition into a non-feasible one.
3 The Papal Conclave
3.1 A brief history
Despite the importance of the bishop of Rome in the Catholic Church, rel-
atively little is known about the first popes. The Bible itself provides no
rules “how bishops were selected, but the process of choosing the seven dea-
cons detailed in Acts (6:1–6) influenced the way they were.” (Baumgartner,
2003, p 4) Peter probably appointed Linus as his successor, while the the
first account of an election is that of Fabian in 236, although records for the
time before 400 are considered unreliable. Over the centuries the election
of the new Pope has changed a lot. Until the late renaissance times Papal
elections have often been bitter, even violent conflicts between strong candi-
dates coming from strong Roman families, between parties supporting Rome
versus the emperor (first the Byzantine then the Holy Roman emperor) or
candidates loyal to the king of France or to Italy. Initially the voting game
was not even proper: multiple popes could be elected simultaneously creat-
ing a temporary schism in the Church. To eliminate this awful situation the
Third Lateran Council (1179) prescribed a two-third majority of all voting
cardinals (Baumgartner, 2003, p 32). The idea was that no faction can elect
its “own” Pope, who is, on the other hand resented by the opposition. The
two third majority implied that no ‘strong’ candidates could be elected. In
practice, however, making it to the election was difficult and often only a
very small portion of cardinals were present. In 1191 only 8 cardinals voted
of the 31 cardinals then alive. Such elections undermined the legitimacy
of the pope and cardinals lived increasingly in Rome to be available for
elections.
In 1241 the cardinals have been locked up in a building and the word
conclave, coming from cum clave (“with keys”) can since then be used for
the electing body. While the number of cardinals have been kept low, for
a long time it was limited to 24, reaching a compromise was not always
trivial. According to the records the decision to 40 months to be reached in
1268-72 (Baumgartner, 2003, p 37). To avoid similar situations the elected
Gregory X issued the bull Ubi Periculum that specified some the rules of
the conclave in great detail. In 1294 the hermite Pietro de Murronne was
elected to become Celestine V. While becoming the pope has been a dream
for many, he considered it a burden and wanted to abdicate. Before tha
actual abdication he announced to apply the conclave’s rules “however a
vacancy might occur in the papacy”. (Baumgartner, 2003, p 45). The vote
after his abdication is the first instance when the actual voting records have
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survived. The voting has not been anonymous and a two-third majority
plus one vote was required “to ensure that a cardinal’s vote for himself did
not provide the margin of victory” (Baumgartner, 2003, p 46). For a long
time yet it was common that cardinals name more than one candidate on
their ballots, so that the voting was actually approval voting with a qualified
majority.
Since then the rules have changed little. John-Paul II (1996) introduced
the clause that after 33 unsuccessful rounds simple majority suffices to elect
the pople. This rule has been criticised that it does not force an agreement
upon the cardinals making a simple majority enough to elect a pope if the
electors hold out for long enough. Benedict XVI (2007) essentially reverted
to the original requirement of a two-third majority.
3.2 The cardinals
While the election is at the influence of the Holy Spirit, those are ultimately
the cardinals who cast their votes and in the past a number of objective
factors have clearly been good predictors of the final outcome. Magister
(2013) lists four characteristics of the cardinals – besides their name: na-
tionality, age, who made them cardinal and whether they belong (or have
belonged) to the Curia. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to re-
view the discussions why these might play a role, but a few points may be
noted: The bishop of Rome has been more often than not Italian; whether
a pope is Italian or not, is a central question. Currently Latin America
is the continent with the largest number of Catholics and despite having
only 19 cardinals together with cardinals of North America and some Eu-
ropean Latin countries have a strong voting block. Ultimately the question
is wether the pope is European or non-European. After the long reign of
John Paul II many favoured an older pope; now the feelings are at least
ambiguous. Cardinals at the curia are well known and well connected in
the Church but lack pastoral experience and may be more affected by the
so-called Vatileaks scandals. This trade-off might play an important role,
too. We consider two characteristics: physical distance from Rome and a
measure of conservatism. The first is a one-dimensional proxy for national-
ity and the associated “games”, the second has become important since the
Church faces serious challenges from the rapidly changing society.
We measure distance by the distance, denoted di of the birthplace of
the cardinal (obtained from the cardinals’ Wikipedia pages) from Rome.
For conservatism we use a very simple Google-metric: of the number of
hits for the searches Is “X” conservative? and Is “X” liberal? we take
the percentage of the first. While this metric, denoted ci for cardinal i is
admittedly imperfect when compared with comments by Vatican insiders,
cardinals known for their conservatism tend to score high on our chart, while
known liberals usually score low. Note that a liberal cardinal may still be
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seen very conservative by the society. These two scores uniquely determine
the location of a cardinal on the policy space.
3.3 The majority
Given the distribution of cardinals over this two-dimensional space we look
for coalitions that (i) are convex and (ii) have the required majority. Observe
that coalitions with supermajority, that is with more members than the
required quota are not interesting for us, since here none of the cardinals
are critical, no-one can push his own policy. In coalitions with the (exact)
majority each cardinal on the borderline of the coalition is swing, that is,
his presence is essential for the coalition. What are the convex coalitions in
this setting? A cardinal c with position (cx, cy) belongs to a coalition S if
and only if there exist four (not necessarily distinct) cardinals e, f, g, h in S,
such that ex ≤ cx ≤ gx and fy ≤ cy ≤ hy.
In order to find the influence of the individual cardinals we must first
identify all such coalitions. These coalitions are really rectangles spanned
by 2 or more positions in the policy space. For each rectangle we must
identify the cardinals on the borderline – each of these cardinals get a point
for being swing/critical. The value of each cardinal is given as the total
points collected, normalized to 1. Note that due to the fact that cardinals
only differ in their positions, the game is symmetric. In particular, the
probability of forming any of the minimal winning coalitions is the same. In
such a game the Shapley-Shubik index coincides with the Banzhaf index we
calculated.
3.4 The algorithm for identifying the minimal winning coali-
tions
The cardinals, denoted by c1, c2, . . . , c115 are treated as points in the plane
where the horizontal axis (x) represents the distance from Rome and the
vertical axis (y) represents the conservatism of the cardinals.
In the following we calculate the influence of each cardinal by finding all
rectangles corresponding to minimal winning coalitions and checking how
frequently a particular cardinal is placed on the outline of such a rectangles.
First we provide the general outline of our method and then provide a more
efficient algorithm
1. Select the left, right, bottom, and top side of our rectangle: Chose an
arbitrary not necessarily different quadruple of cardinals S = {l, r, b, t} ⊂
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N , such that
lx = min
k∈S
kx
rx = max
k∈S
kx
by = min
k∈S
ky
ty = max
k∈S
ky
2. Check the number of cardinals with positions in the closed rectangle
spanned by S. If it is exactly 77, S spans a minimal winning coalition.
3. Check that the rectangle has not been considered before.
4. Give points to cardinals on the borderline.
5. Rank according to the points given.
Since the points need not be disjoint, there are more than
( |N |
4
)
or in
our case about 7 million rectangles to look at.
A more systematic search is more economical. The detailed algorithm
we have used can be found in Appendix A.
4 Results
In Table 1 we present a list of the cardinals together with their coordinates
and the number of minimal winning coalitions where they are critical. Dis-
tance is given in kilometers, while conservatism in basis points.
Table 1: Cardinals ranked by the number of minimal winning coalitions
where they are critical
rank cardinal cx (km) cy (bp) score
1 George Pell 15902 4477 599
2 Francisco Javier Erra´zuriz Ossa 11921 4617 572
3 Jorge Bergoglio 11162 4507 546
4 Leonardo Sandri 11162 4967 536
5 The´odore-Adrien Sarr 4181 185 517
6 Juan Luis Cipriani Thorne 10873 4247 497
7 Telesphore Placidus Toppo 6039 7264 481
8 Agostino Vallini 34 4992 461
8 Jean-Pierre Ricard 603 6396 461
10 James Michael Harvey 7686 734 459
11 Francisco Robles Ortega 10563 3134 455
12 Dominik Duka 961 6394 444
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Table 1: Cardinals ranked by the number of minimal winning coalitions
where they are critical
rank cardinal cx (km) cy (bp) score
13 Antonio Mar´ıa Rouco Varela 1653 817 440
14 Baselios Cleemis 7183 6391 426
15 Odilo Scherer 10408 4399 424
16 Luis Antonio Tagle 10403 2568 420
17 Be´chara Boutros Ra¨ı 2214 877 419
17 Norberto Rivera Carrera 10384 2973 419
19 Rube´n Salazar Go´mez 9392 113 410
20 Andre´ Vingt-Trois 1107 925 397
21 Juan Sandoval I´n˜iguez 10376 1560 391
22 John Tong Hon 9279 6064 387
23 Antonio Maria Veglio` 213 4649 385
23 Jorge Urosa 8365 1491 385
25 Llu´ıs Mart´ınez Sistach 859 1190 383
26 Velasio de Paolis 83 5183 379
26 Crescenzio Sepe 176 3364 379
28 Roger Mahony 10201 5863 377
29 Francesco Monterisi 323 5013 375
30 Raffaele Farina 220 4609 366
31 Giuseppe Betori 119 2871 365
32 John Onaiyekan 3843 5956 362
33 Angelo Amato 351 2524 355
34 Rau´l Eduardo Vela Chiriboga 10234 5526 352
35 Josip Bozanic´ 414 2616 347
36 Jean-Louis Tauran 1105 5643 341
37 Justin Francis Rigali 10201 5295 337
38 Carlo Caffarra 390 3734 332
38 Joa˜o Braz de Aviz 9911 3119 332
40 George Alencherry 6857 5589 325
41 Sea´n Patrick O’Malley 8984 5300 311
42 Julio Terrazas Sandoval 10325 216 308
43 Raymundo Damasceno Assis 9062 2676 298
44 Carlos Amigo Vallejo 1449 2273 297
45 Mauro Piacenza 401 4179 292
46 Manuel Monteiro de Castro 1755 2327 279
47 William Levada 10224 4244 276
48 Rainer Woelki 1092 5499 271
49 Domenico Calcagno 432 3643 267
50 Nicola´s de Jesu´s Lo´pez Rodr´ıguez 10836 6034 266
51 Ennio Antonelli 99 5542 262
52 Jose´ Policarpo 1834 2447 261
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Table 1: Cardinals ranked by the number of minimal winning coalitions
where they are critical
rank cardinal cx (km) cy (bp) score
53 Angelo Bagnasco 423 4488 258
54 Stanis law Dziwisz 1029 5378 253
55 Cla´udio Hummes 10317 7841 245
56 Severino Poletto 424 3931 243
57 Angelo Comastri 108 1206 239
58 Ivan Dias 6183 3299 237
59 Paolo Sardi 453 4891 235
60 Timothy M. Dolan 8148 5217 230
61 Giovanni Lajolo 503 5010 228
62 O´scar Andre´s Rodr´ıguez Maradiaga 9758 4327 205
63 Fernando Filoni 463 4759 200
63 John Njue 9509 4911 200
65 Dionigi Tettamanzi 498 4979 195
66 Edwin Frederick O’Brien 6879 5247 191
67 Pham Minh Man 9557 4600 188
68 Francesco Coccopalmerio 466 3855 184
69 Giovanni Battista Re 487 4631 168
70 Vinko Puljic´ 516 3387 163
71 Gianfranco Ravasi 490 3961 153
72 Antonios Naguib 2258 5087 143
73 Sea´n Brady 1978 5054 129
74 Franc Rode´ 503 4388 126
74 Giuseppe Versaldi 503 4657 126
76 Geraldo Majella Agnelo 9119 3995 124
77 Antonio Can˜izares Llovera 1182 3195 116
78 Attilio Nicora 527 3602 113
79 Oswald Gracias 6183 5309 104
80 Angelo Scola 506 4424 91
81 Philippe Barbarin 1093 5004 90
82 Jaime Lucas Ortega y Alamino 8653 4770 88
83 Polycarp Pengo 5937 5000 78
84 Santos Abril y Castello´ 1144 3401 73
85 Paolo Romeo 526 4277 69
86 Reinhard Marx 1126 3447 64
86 Wilfrid Napier 8215 4204 64
88 Daniel DiNardo 7382 4941 55
89 Giuseppe Bertello 532 3851 51
90 Kazimierz Nycz 1140 3629 46
91 Marc Ouellet 7911 4605 45
92 Kurt Koch 665 3779 42
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Table 1: Cardinals ranked by the number of minimal winning coalitions
where they are critical
rank cardinal cx (km) cy (bp) score
92 Donald Wuerl 7334 4927 42
92 Raymond Leo Burke 7822 4813 42
95 Tarcisio Bertone 538 4696 39
96 Stanis law Ry lko 1033 3675 31
97 Francis George 7749 4579 28
98 Karl Lehmann 736 3836 24
99 Paul Josef Cordes 1077 4852 15
99 Malcolm Ranjith 7643 4509 15
101 Thomas Christopher Collins 7153 3790 14
102 Walter Kasper 778 4599 13
103 Wim Eijk 1293 4842 10
104 Pe´ter Erdo˝ 811 4008 9
104 Audrys Bacˇkis 1671 3826 9
106 Christoph Scho¨nborn 971 4139 1
107 Joachim Meisner 1083 4698 0
107 Godfried Danneels 1231 4043 0
107 Zenon Grocholewski 1335 3877 0
107 Anthony Olubunmi Okogie 4047 4727 0
107 Gabriel Zubeir Wako 4098 4474 0
107 Robert Sarah 4165 4077 0
107 Peter Turkson 4319 3887 0
107 Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya 5004 3936 0
107 Jean-Claude Turcotte 6588 4632 0
Total 28192
5 Discussion
The obtained ranking contains some interesting findings. Firstly note Pope
Francis at rank 3. With this our ranking method proved to be more suc-
cessful to identify the next Pope than many well-informed analysts. To the
best of our knowledge cardinal Bergoglio was not mentioned among the pa-
pabili, the people who are likely to become the next pope. On the other
hand the papabili ended in much lower positions, Peter Turkson, a strong
African candidate turned out to be a null player, that is, a player who is
never critical.
A closer inspection of the results also reveals that Pope Francis was
right when he mentioned that the conclave had to go to the other end of
the world to find the suitable person to become the new pope: all our top
candidates are from far away places, in fact our top candidates are the
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cardinals with the birthplaces most distant from Rome. This is hardly a
surprising result. The Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1948) stating that
the society will choose the median voter’s choice assumes that the voters’
positions are distributed unidimensionally and that decisions are taken with
simple majority. As soon as a qualified majority is required, the median
voter becomes a null player, while voters with more extreme positions gain
influence. The results do not generalise to preferences in a multi-dimensional
space (for a discussion see Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)), but the intuition is
similar: Very central cardinals will rarely be critical (if at all), while cardinals
with relatively extreme location or level of conservativism are likely to do
well. While the list is topped by cardinals with very distant birthplaces,
they are soon followed by cardinals who have extreme positions along the
liberal/conservative axis. The first Italian, Augostino Vallini is also the
cardinal born closest to Rome. To test if the results are due more to the
majority voting with a qualified majority or due to the two-dimensional
location of the cardinals. Repeating the calculations with simple majority
does not result in wild changes with the top three keeping their positions.
While it would be difficult to repeat the same exercise for the election
of Pope Benedict XVI, one must note that being a German cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger had a near-median distance, but was considered rather a con-
servative. With such a position he would have likely scored high in our
ranking.
A Algorithm to find minimal winning coalitions
Let ξ be the inverse of a (not necessarily unique) permutation of indices
that arranges the cardinals in a non-decreasing order according to their x
coordinates. Hence cξ(1) is the closest to Rome and cξ(115) is the farthest
from it. Similarly let η be the inverse of a permutation that arranges the
cardinals in a non-decreasing order according to their y coordinate, where
cη(1) indicates the most liberal among them.
1. Let R collect feasible rectangles and set R = ∅ and let s ∈ Z115 denote
a score function with s = 0.
2. Starting from cξ(1) take the leftmost cardinal as l and allow all cardi-
nals to be considered for r, t, b.
3. Starting from cη(1) take the cardinal b with the lowest cy satisfying
bx ≥ lx and by ≤ ly and allow all cardinals to be considered for r, t.
4. Starting from cξ(115) take the rightmost cardinal as r if it satisfies
rx ≥ bx and ry ≥ by and allow all cardinals to be considered for t.
5. Starting from cη(115) the the cardinal t with the highest cy satisfying
ty ≥ ly, ty ≥ ry, tx ≥ lx and tx ≤ rx.
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6. If the rectangle has exactly 77 cardinals, check if it is in the list of
rectangles R. If it is not
(a) Store it in the list R.
(b) Give points to each cardinal on the borderline.
7. Take the next t while ty ≥ cη(77)y .
8. Take the next r while rx ≥ cη(77)x .
9. Take the next b while by ≤ cη(39)y .
10. Take the next l while lx ≤ cη(39)x .
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